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Security
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As a participant in iGEM, there are three things you can do right now to help us secure our science: | As a participant in iGEM, there are three things you can do right now to help us secure our science: | ||
(1) Include something in you project description and presentations that demonstrates that you have thought about how others could misuse your work | (1) Include something in you project description and presentations that demonstrates that you have thought about how others could misuse your work | ||
Revision as of 13:24, 8 October 2009
- Piers Millet
- BWC ISU
- bwc@unog.ch
- www.unog.ch/bwc
The BWC Implementation Support Unit is the closest thing to an international organisation to ensure biology is used solely for beneficial purposes. Housed in the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva, we help States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (the international treaty) in banning the hostile use of biology. As a microbiologist and chartered biologist, I support the technical aspects of the ISU's work. I am very excited about the things that applying an engineering approach to biology will let us do and am keen to find ways to work with those involved in iGEM, you, to ensure biology continues to be used safely, securely and solely for our collective benefit.
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"Biology should be more fun. It should be about exploring the world around us. We should want to get out there and do things. We should be able to do things more easily. Securing biology should be something that helps us do that. It cannot be something that gets in the way." |
Scientific research continues to bring us new and unexpected knowledge, technologies and approaches. Synthetic biology, being on the very cutting edge of what is possible, promises unprecedented opportunities health, wealth and better living. But science and technology can be used for destructive purposes as well as for constructive ones. Refining our control of biology opens up chances to intentionally cause harm to humans, animals, plants and the environment that just did not exist before. That’s why it is more important now, than ever before, for us to think about how others might use what we are doing in ways we would not be happy with.
| As a participant in iGEM, there are three things you can do right now to help us secure our science: (1) Include something in you project description and presentations that demonstrates that you have thought about how others could misuse your work (2) Contribute to community discussions on what needs to go into a code against the use of our science for hostile purposes (see A Community Response) (3) Look into what security provisions, such as laws and regulations, are already in place in your country (see Working within the Law) | Securing biology is not a simple task. It is not something those outside biology could, or should, do alone. Equally, this is not something that biologists can do by themselves (our focus, as the name implies is on the biology). This is a truly interdisciplinary problem that will need us to work together, in new ways, with new partners, to find an approach that provides benefits for all. Given the interdisciplinary nature of synthetic biology, and the experience the community has in drawing in people from different backgrounds, we are well placed to position ourselves on the cutting edge of how science interacts with society and to help write the rules which will govern this ‘century of biology’. |
Securing Modern Biology
In this section of the page you will find a range of reports, presentations and other resources on various aspects of security."Why Secure Modern Biology" video
This is a 30 minute video of me arguing why we need to secure synthetic biology and biological engineering at SB4.0 in Hong Kong in 2008. It includes a short quiz that demontrates how hard it is to spot the use of biology for hostile purposes. It looks at some of the problems with trying to secure biology through top-down governmental approaches and the need to find a community-based response to this shared problem.
