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Team:KULeuven/Ethics
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| - | A major issue is the uncontrolled release of the biological machines. But most times a synthetic machine is too weak to survive in the wild. Probably an accidental release wont have major consequences. But it’s important to consider the possibility. The treat of escape can be minimized by engineering bacteria dependent on nutrients that don’t occur in a natural environment. This will reduce there capacity to compete with natural occurring bacteria. Another solution is the use of synthetic components of the DNA structure such that the organisms cannot replicate without them. Using a ‘self-destruct’ mechanism which is triggered when the population density becomes too great can be another way to minimize the risk. | + | A major issue is the uncontrolled release of the biological machines. But most times a synthetic machine is too weak to survive in the wild. Probably an accidental release wont have major consequences. But it’s important to consider the possibility. The treat of escape can be minimized by engineering bacteria dependent on nutrients that don’t occur in a natural environment. This will reduce there capacity to compete with natural occurring bacteria. Another solution is the use of synthetic components of the DNA structure such that the organisms cannot replicate without them. Using a ‘self-destruct’ mechanism which is triggered when the population density becomes too great can be another way to minimize the risk. But biological machines are still evolutionary machines and are subject to natural selection and gene flow. Mutations in the genome of the synthetic organisms can interact with organisms living in the environment. This can result in unexpected and potentially dangerous new organisms. It may provide advantages over natural organisms leading to unexpected proliferation and changing the ecosystem. (3) |
| - | But biological machines are still evolutionary machines and are subject to natural selection and gene flow. Mutations in the genome of the synthetic organisms can interact with organisms living in the environment. This can result in unexpected and potentially dangerous new organisms. It may provide advantages over natural organisms leading to unexpected proliferation and changing the ecosystem. (3) | + | |
Revision as of 13:43, 13 August 2009
Overview
The development of synthetic biology has several consequences. It has potential benefits such as the cheap production of drugs or chemicals. Although most people will agree synthetic biology is a good thing, one must not forget that there’s a side effect. It’s important to consider the dangers of synthetic live forms. Ethics are playing an important role in international conferences indicating a need for ethical debate, regulation and safe practice. (1)
- A code of ethics and standards should emerge for biological engineering as it has done for other engineering disciplines. - Church G. (2)
- Learning from gene therapy, we should imagine worst-case scenarios and protect against them. - Church G. (2)
In the literature five areas of concern on ethical biology can be identified: uncontrolled release in the environment, bioterrorism, patenting and the creation of monopolies, trade and global justice and the creation of artificial life. (3)
A major issue is the uncontrolled release of the biological machines. But most times a synthetic machine is too weak to survive in the wild. Probably an accidental release wont have major consequences. But it’s important to consider the possibility. The treat of escape can be minimized by engineering bacteria dependent on nutrients that don’t occur in a natural environment. This will reduce there capacity to compete with natural occurring bacteria. Another solution is the use of synthetic components of the DNA structure such that the organisms cannot replicate without them. Using a ‘self-destruct’ mechanism which is triggered when the population density becomes too great can be another way to minimize the risk. But biological machines are still evolutionary machines and are subject to natural selection and gene flow. Mutations in the genome of the synthetic organisms can interact with organisms living in the environment. This can result in unexpected and potentially dangerous new organisms. It may provide advantages over natural organisms leading to unexpected proliferation and changing the ecosystem. (3)
As DNA sequencing becomes cheaper and it becomes easier to buy second hand equipment over the internet, more people are able to build their own biological machines. This can result in an uncontrolled use of synthetic biology. Already on the internet a publication on synthetic biology written in simple, non-technical language has appeared. (4) This allows everybody who’s able to get the right equipment to experiment with genes and organisms. Also people who know nothing about the possible threat of synthetic organisms. Although the concept of biohacking is starting to develop over the internet, there isn’t much evidence that there’s any active practice. The creation of new dangerous and efficient species (deliberately or by accident) isn’t readily to occur. It’s more likely that there will be a threat from the creation of already known pathogens than from new synthetic organisms. Knowing the sequences of extremely deadly pathogens could pose threats to public safety and health that might outweigh the benefits. But even if these dangerous organisms can be produced, it’s hard to ‘weaponise’ them. (3)
Building new organisms raises commercialization issues that will affect the conduct of research and ability of industry and academia to continue development. The Chakrabarty case ruled that genetically altered organisms are not products of nature and thus are patentable. (6) Intellectual property management holds two concerns, namely patents that are too broad and those too narrow. Broad patents may restrict further development and narrow ones may over-complicate everything. The latter means that too many patents have to be negotiated which complicates the research process. (3) Current patenting practice may already be restricting development and access to clinical applications and researchers’ access to genetic information and reagents. A new regulatory framework need to ensure that public and commercial interests are protected. (6)
References
1. Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology [online]. Available at: http://syntheticbiology.org/SB2Declaration.html. [Date of search: 10/08/09].
2. Church, G. (2005). Let us go forth and safely multiply. Nature, vol. 438: 423.
3. Balmer, A. & Martin, P. (Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council). (2008). Synthetic Biology Social and Ethical Challenges.
4. Mohr, S.C. (2007). Primer for Synthetic Biology [online]. Available at: http://openwetware.org/images/3/3d/SB_Primer_100707.pdf. [Date of search: 11/08/09].
5. Tucker, J.B. & Zilinskas, R.A. (2006). The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology. The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society, Spring 2006: 25-45.
6. Cho M.K., Magnus D., Caplan A.L., McGee D. & the Ethics of Genomics Group. (1999). Ethical Considerations in Synthesizing a Minimal Genome. Science, vol. 286, issue 5447, 2087-2090.
